Beyond Normative Ethics: Toward an Ethical Intuitionism for Psychoanalysis
'The Freudian conception of the process by which the subject is constituted is fundamentally dialectical in nature and involves the notion that the subject is created and sustained (and at the same time decentred from itself) through the dialectical interplay of consciousness and unconsciousness.' — Thomas Ogden
My main object in this paper is to examine the insufficiency of normative ethics for psychoanalysis. In advocating for an ethical intuitionist framework, I demonstrate my support for a psychoanalytic ethical process that examines both conscious and unconscious elements. My path leads through important ethical concepts like normative ethics, metaethics, Love, the work of Love, integrating ethical perspectives and engaging sincerely with feminist and postcolonial critiques. In comparing relational and rationalist ethical psychoanalytic texts like Drozek's and Lacan's, my conclusions compel a call toward a metamorphosis in the ethical process of psychoanalysis and its resituating as a work of Love.[1]
The Advent of Metaethics
On the morning of 11th October 1903, George Edward Moore was greeted with a fervent letter penned by his Cambridge companion, Giles Lytton Strachey. Known affectionately as Lytton, he was the sibling of James Strachey—the eminent translator who rendered the comprehensive works of Sigmund Freud into English. Lytton's missive on the impact of Moore’s work exuberantly hailed the insights nestled within, thus:
‘I think your book has not only wrecked and shattered all writers on Ethics from Aristotle and Christ to Herbert Spencer and Mr Bradley, it has not laid the true foundations of Ethics, it has not only left all modern philosophy bafouee—these seem to me small achievements compared to the establishment of that Method which shines like a sword between the lines. It is a scientific method deliberately applied, for the first time, to Reasoning…I date from Oct. 1903 the beginning of the Age of Reason.’
Lytton’s hyperbole was not entirely unfounded. With a singular stroke, Moore's Principia revolutionised the landscape of ethical studies—transcending the conventional realm of normative ethics, ushering the philosophical realm into the uncharted waters of 'metaethics,' the meticulous examination of ethical concepts.[2] This change in basic assumptions would cast a long, indelible shadow over philosophical ethics, its influence resonating through the twentieth century, manifesting in the intellectual legacies of figures ranging from W. D. Ross (1877-1971), Elizabeth Anscombe (1919-2001), John Rawls (1921-2002), and Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Thus, by extolling the audacious intellectual venture encapsulated in Principia, Lytton was acknowledging Moore’s radical augmentation of ethical traditions rooted in Moses, Plato and Aristotle.
The fizz of Lytton's grand claims about his friend’s work remains contestable. However, what emerges with less contest is Moore's ingenious morphing of normative ethics into a domain that is not confined to or birthed from clever argumentation. Metaethics, as a philosophical frontier, opened into the promise of the essence of ethics and the fabric of ethical language. Its quest was to unearth the basic assumptions and principles steering ethical thought and discourse. Metaethics use of linguistic and conceptual analysis to clarify ethical terms became a staple of ethical inquiry. As we know, the endeavour to appreciate the ethical dimensions within psychoanalysis has long been a complex but vital enterprise. As Moore elegantly articulated through his ethical intuitionism, moral quandaries require a unique lens, separate from the empirical or naturalistic.
I propose ethical intuitionism's relevance to psychoanalytic practice, providing a foundation for a meta-ethical discourse. My hope for this paper is not merely a short-circuited historical or theoretical exegesis; instead, I would like to question normative ethics such as they are in psychoanalysis by sketching a conceptual analysis of historical foundations, clinical realities, theoretical underpinnings, and emerging paradigms. I want to question the underlying ethical subtleties veiled within important psychoanalytic concepts such as transference and countertransference, ask about the intricacies of clinical ethical dilemmas, and inquire into emergent ethical landscapes shaped by feminist, post-colonial, and critical theories. I want to question whether or to what extent going forwards an ethical intuitionist position may better situate psychoanalysis as an ethical process.
Within the realm of psychoanalytic ethics, Love or 'Eros functions as the pivotal index for both goods and rights. The following sections seek to delineate how normative ethics might not seamlessly transpose onto the domain of clinical psychoanalytic ethics or practice. In the later sections, succinctly, I will ask whether or to what extent relational or rationalist ethics may provide fundamental challenges or opportunities, which will form the linchpin for entering into the Lacanian critique of normative ethics. At the same time, it behoves those of us interested in psychoanalysis to note that psychoanalytic ethics, as a continually evolving field, has been both enriched and critiqued primarily—whether rightly or not—through its interaction with normative ethics and its basic assumptions.
Lacan posits that the Freudian asteroid monumentally redefined ethics by proffering a compelling critique of traditional ethical notions. He audaciously juxtaposes 'human flourishing' (or happiness) with 'misery', thereby catalysing profound scrutiny of the foundational ethos of ethical thought surrounding ‘the Good’ as a point of departure or as a point of lack. To put it differently, a discernible discord exists between Aristotelian and Lacanian perspectives on human flourishing and misery. Aristotle envisions human flourishing (Eudemonia) as palpable, attainable, and desirable through the adherence to reason and virtue. In contrast, Lacan underscores the logical inevitability of human misery stemming from the subject’s origination in lack in relation to ‘the Good’—albeit he employs the essentialist moniker ‘the Thing’—culminating in and stimulating henceforward the drive as such towards desire. As should be clear from the outset, the narratives encompassing psychoanalytic ethics are not unsophisticated, often entangled with established Westernised philosophical traditions, for better or worse, requiring quite an appetite for such things from the reader.
From its genesis, psychoanalysis has grappled with ethical conundrums, often imbibing a priori content from the reservoir of moral thought and discourse. Even though embroiled in the ethical dialogues of his era, Freud abstained from articulating moral imperatives, cognisant of the complex panorama of human behaviour, and abstained from proffering sweeping judgements, leaving such endeavours to others. This circumspect ethos engendered a modicum of objectivity in Freud’s oeuvre, significantly bolstering his enduring imprint on psychology. The ethical landscape of psychoanalysis has incrementally evolved, profoundly shaped by relational/structural models championed by luminaries like Melanie Klein, D.W. Winnicott, Jay Greenberg, Stephen Mitchell, and Peter Fonagy. Hence, a group of individuals have contributed to the burgeoning evolution of ethical discourse in psychoanalysis, morphing it into a multi-layered, complex ethical framework that ceaselessly prompts discovery.
Foundations of Relational Psychoanalytic Ethics
Since psychotherapy's inception, psychoanalysis has navigated human ethics using the compass of Love or Eros as a primary ethical gauge. This gauge illuminates what is fundamentally considered good practice in interpersonal dynamics. In a psychoanalytic setting, goods could be the clinician's ability to maintain a 'holding environment' where the client feels safe to explore their thoughts and feelings. Rightness might involve respecting the client's autonomy and not imposing the clinician's own moral or ethical beliefs. Thus conceived, Love informs how clinicians approach the therapeutic relationship, aiming for a compassionate and non-possessive interaction with the client. Elevating Love to a pinnacle position diverges sharply from traditional ethical models rooted in reason, duty, or faith. In psychoanalytic practice, ethics often emerge not as clear-cut rules but as deep-seated habits and cultural norms but as goods larger than normative valuations of what is meant by Love or the work of Love.
Cultural norms are not merely passive backdrops; they actively shape the moral frameworks that both clinicians and clients bring into the therapeutic space. For instance, a clinician's understanding of family dynamics might be deeply influenced by their cultural background, affecting their interpretation of a client's familial relationships. Such cultural scripts require ethical scrutiny to ensure they neither reinforce oppressive structures nor undermine the client's autonomy. The influence of culture raises the question of ethical relativism. Is it ethical to apply a universal standard of 'the Good' and 'the Right' in a multicultural therapeutic setting? While some may argue for the merits of ethical universalism, it is crucial to acknowledge that what is considered 'ethical' can vary significantly across different cultures. Thus, a balanced approach that respects cultural diversity while upholding universal ethical principles may be most appropriate. Cultural competence is not just a 'nice-to-have' but an ethical imperative in contemporary psychoanalytic practice. Clinicians must be equipped to navigate the complexities that arise from cultural differences, such as varying attitudes towards authority figures, gender roles, and even the concept of mental health itself. Failure to do so can lead to ethical lapses, such as misdiagnosis, stereotyping, or even causing harm to the client.
Habits refer to recurring clinician-client interactions with ethical implications that shape the therapeutic environment, raising questions of authority, influence, and care. The way a clinician structures their sessions—whether they invite dialogue, how they manage silence, or their approach to setting boundaries—can all be seen as habits that have ethical implications. These habits can either empower the client or inadvertently establish a hierarchical dynamic. Customs bear cultural significance, shaping the therapeutic alliance with societal norms and moral frameworks. These scripts require ethical review to avoid reinforcing oppression or compromising client autonomy. A clinician must be cautious when interpreting a client's narrative through the lens of cultural norms. For example, pathologising a client's non-binary gender identity based on societal scripts would be an ethical mistake, reinforcing oppressive structures. Customary ethics intersect personal beliefs and collective norms, meriting in-depth ethical and meta-ethical analysis. This could involve a clinician reflecting on how their personal beliefs about, say, the importance of individual autonomy intersect with cultural norms about the role of family in an individual's life. Love is considered normatively as compassionate, non-possessive concern for the client's well-being. In a therapeutic context, this would mean that the clinician maintains a professional boundary while also deeply engaging with the client's emotional world, embodying a form of Love that is both ethical and conducive to healing. Drawing a parallel with ethical intuitionism (see page 2), Love in therapy (the work of Love) serves as a distinct yet integral moral guide, separate from codified ethics. This revision implies that while formal ethical guidelines are important, there is also room for intuitive moral reasoning in psychoanalysis. For example, a clinician might rely on their intuitive sense of Love or compassion when navigating complex ethical dilemmas for which guidelines offer no clear answer. This view of Love resonates with the psychoanalytic notion of 'holding,' wherein the clinician provides a safe emotional haven for client introspection. This nuanced view acknowledges the significance of subtle ethics, overlooked by strict moral codes or utilitarian metrics but inherent in complex relational dynamics. Unlike a medical doctor who has clear-cut ethical guidelines like the Hippocratic Oath, an analytical clinician might rely more on the unspoken norms of their training and the culture of psychoanalysis itself. For instance, maintaining confidentiality might be an ingrained habit rather than a rule explicitly stated at each session. This enriched perspective recognises the importance of implicit ethical nuances, captured neither by rigid moral codes nor by utilitarian calculations but existing in the intricate dynamics of relational practice. However, it is perhaps vital to introduce Moore's naturalistic fallacy, cautioning that 'the Good' should not be equated with natural traits like goods, for example, pleasure, well-being or love. This meta-ethical inclusion to psychoanalysis's focus on Love confirms its role as a distinct yet essential moral guide in broader ethical discussions. Thus, equating Love with goods in psychoanalytic ethics ensures avoidance of the naturalistic fallacy.
As outlined by Jessica Benjamin (1988), merging ethics with Love marks a significant shift in moral philosophy, a legacy from psychoanalytic tradition.[3] This claim highlights psychoanalysis's focus on Love's intuitive dimension for fostering moral awareness and growth, diverging from rational or abstract terrains. The passions and paradoxes in Love serve as fundamentally humanising factors in ethical discourse. This focus on Love as a key ethical gauge has multiple implications. First, an ethic for love challenges traditional ethical models that prioritize rationality, highlighting Love's central role in moral intuition and emotional intelligence. Second, framing Love as an ethical cornerstone allows psychoanalysis to resist simplistic metrics, focusing instead on trust and rapport quality. Third, psychoanalysis acknowledges Love as a complex ethical force of profound magnitude, embodying the capacity to both engender care and altruism and, when perverted, incite possessiveness and cruelty. Psychoanalysis, hence, delineates Love in its inherent ambiguity, acknowledging and eschewing idealisation. Thus, the endeavour to define clinical ethics through the prism of Love necessitates a nuanced psychoanalytic engagement as opposed to mere prescriptive dictums. The ethical significance attributed to Love within the psychoanalytic discourse has seen an evolution over time. Although interpretations of Love's ethical dimensions may diverge, a consensus prevails among various psychoanalytic schools that the treatment of Love within psychoanalytic thought markedly deviates from its exposition in broader philosophical discourses. This subtle complexity beckons a comparative analysis, fostering a deeper understanding of Love's ethical import.
In the elucidation provided by Robert Drozek (2019), the quintessence of psychoanalytic ethics is anchored in the deliberate traversing of the complex dialectics interlinking the realms of consciousness and unconsciousness.[4] Psychoanalysis as a discipline convenes and continually strives to connect with clients within this threshold realm—a liminal space nestled between manifest realities and the submerged reservoir of drives or desires. The contention made is that psychoanalysis, at its core, is envisaged as 'an ethical process,' a crucible wherein the engagements of consciousness with the external world and the internal dominion of the unconscious self are alloyed. Embarked upon this profound pathway, the psychoanalytic practitioner is entrusted with an ethical mandate: to reverence ethical professionalism and navigate the everyday yet profound tension betwixt the conscious and unconscious sides of the inter-psychic.
In the schema articulated by Drozek (2019), the clinician's primary ethical endeavour is to uphold the conscious and unconscious dimensions in consonance, eschewing the capitulation or forfeiture of one domain at the altar of the other. The heart of psychoanalytic ethics, according to Drozek, pulsates with 'simultaneous attentiveness' to both the conscious and unconscious experience. This dialectical ethics is enacted through clinical practices such as free association, dream analysis, and transference interpretation—avenues through which the ceaseless collaboration between conscious insight and latent unconscious significances or desires is unveiled. As posited by Drozek (2019), central to this relational dialectic is the notion of ‘human dignity,’ which is heralded as the primary technical and ethical fulcrum propelling psychoanalytic healing.
Yet, as delineated by Drozek (2019), the ethical compass of psychoanalysis extends beyond mere clinical techniques. It encapsulates the nurturing of ethical subjectivity within the clinicians themselves, a departure from Lacan's rationalist linguistic emphasis, spotlighting instead the clinician's pivotal role in piloting the ethical dialectics of consciousness and unconsciousness. It appears, therefore, as an ethical imperative for clinicians to introspect upon their own unconscious biases, anxieties, and desires that may surface within the therapeutic ambit. Moreover, the psychoanalytic comprehension of Love is not devoid of its internal dialectical tensions. Love, with its ability to engender sacrifice and yet spawn possessive control, encapsulate care for the other and yet devolve into narcissistic fantasy, embodies a complex ethical terrain. Psychoanalysis advocates for conscious navigation through the contradictions entwined in Love or tainted Love, propelled by a compass of something more akin to lovingkindness.
Expanding its ethical gaze, psychoanalysis locates the ethics of the work of Love within the larger socio-political landscape. Social ideologies and discourses inherently mould the discourse and practice of the work of Love across private and public spheres. In extremes, malignant machinations of political forces have the potential to engender distorted manifestations of the work of Love and identification structured along the axes of race, nationality, or leader worship. While psychoanalysis offers conceptual instruments to decipher these distortions, it has concurrently been critiqued for its Eurocentric theoretical presuppositions surrounding human development, identity, and the ethical mission of psychoanalysis. Addressing and redressing such limitations thus appears as an ongoing ethical imperative.
By reorienting Love and the quest for shared meaning as the ethical bedrock of psychoanalysis, thinkers akin to Benjamin and Drozek have embarked on a radical reconfiguration of traditional moral philosophy by virtue of their special interest in relational psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic envisioning of ethics, particularly since the relational turn, may no longer be casually perceived as a cascade of top-down duties. Instead, relational psychoanalytic thought morphs into an inter-psychical, fluid, and continually negotiated enterprise, honed through compassionate attentiveness to consciousness and non-conscious processes in the round. Psychoanalysis significantly augments moral discourse, shedding light on the currents, ambiguous passions, and relational intricacies underpinning human conscience. The discourse on what embodies an ethical life and practice remains a dynamically engaged and debated realm within this evolving tradition situated here as the work of Love, albeit not all partake in this ethical parsimony.
Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Pleasure and Desire
The conundrum of balancing an individual's quest to avoid displeasure with the ethical ramifications of such a quest often arises in psychoanalytic therapy. Freud's 'pleasure principle' provides a compelling starting point but clashes starkly with basic moral assumptions and societal expectations that may advocate pleasure-seeking as virtuous or essential. This distinction becomes especially pertinent in a psychoanalytic setting where pleasure-seeking and the avoidance of displeasure have complex ethical implications that intersect with the inner world of the client as well as larger cultural norms (see page 3). Freud's observations on this ethical dimension are amplified further through a Lacanian lens, which interrogates how the 'demand' for happiness can evolve into an ethical directive or obligation. This brings forth a renewed ethical quandary: What are the ethical consequences of steering or manipulating a client's demands for happiness within the therapeutic alliance? When does this pursuit of individual happiness transgress ethical boundaries, devolving into narcissism, entitlement, or even injustice?
This complex ethical terrain invites meta-ethical scrutiny, particularly a tension between consequentialist and deontological frameworks. A consequentialist might contend that the ethical imperative lies in optimising the client's happiness. In contrast, a deontologist may argue that the maximisation of happiness should not sacrifice core ethical tenets like fairness, integrity, or societal cohesion. Such ethical nuance is indispensable, and clinicians ought to sustain vigilant reflexivity. That is to say, clinicians should continually interrogate whether their therapeutic interventions advance genuine well-being or merely comply with social paradigms of what ‘health’ or ‘happiness’ ought to be. This interrogation becomes especially significant when clinicians negotiate the tension between phylogenetic desires (biological or instinctual inclinations) and socially mediated ethical imperatives (rational, moral or legal values).
Let us press the point further by taking the non-conscious to its Lacanian source. The Real, as articulated by Lacan, constitutes one of the three orders alongside the Imaginary and the Symbolic, representing the contour of what lies beyond the epistemological realm—what we might think we know—revealing an unknowable 'ontological absolute, a true being-in-itself.'[5] 10 Slavoj Žižek (1989) described the Real as an elusive, undifferentiated domain. In this lacuna, representation and symbolisation simply fail.[6] The Real may, for some, echo broad similarities to C.G. Jung's concept of 'pleroma.' Often, Lacan's Real is clinically associated with the apprehension of lack, a sense of anxiety and trauma, a core disruptive truth in the face of psychotic hallucination, or the site of ‘the impossible’ that challenges the cohesiveness of an individual's reality.
Like the deities Shiva or Abraxas, the Real destroys and births the possible and the knowable—indeed, the Real reaches significance as the essential gestalt from which all representation begins through the process of the union of Symbolic and Real. The Real triggers anxiety and trauma when it confronts individuals with the inherent impossibility and contradiction nestled within the Symbolic order. Thus, Lacan's conceptualisation of the Real provides a profound—though not clear or accessible—way to explore the limitations and gaps within language as such and human understanding (connaissance) that are inevitably tied up with misunderstanding (méconnaissance) in the Imaginary. Lacan's ethics of psychoanalysis confront the determined reader with the concept of the Real as an incomprehensible mystery outside of epistemic purview rather than offering consolation.
Lacan's psychoanalytic framework, articulated through the topology of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary (RSI), offers a fascinating theoretical lens for examining the ethical dimensions encompassing pleasure and desire. That some may see this ethical approach as irrelevant in everyday life, the RSI sheds enthralling light on the complex irrational motivations underlying human judgments of right and wrong. Indeed this idiosyncratic focus on pleasure and desire borne from lack unveils fundamental aspects of human experience, which are often entangled with everyday ethical considerations of an existential nature. Lacan's RSI topology supplies a distinctive viewpoint that goes beyond a simple ethical inquiry. It reveals a deeper foundation that undermines even existing analytical ethical norms by uncovering the logical outcomes stemming from the identification of non-conscious or irrational motivations.
The triadic interaction encapsulated within the RSI topology—a ‘Borromean knot’ or Venn diagram comprising the unattainable Real, the norm-governed Symbolic, and the illusion-infused Imaginary bound at a single union point of captation—is foregrounded here as pivotal in apprehending how individuals navigate the everyday realms of reality, cultural norms, and self-image. The Lacanian ethic subtly explores the interplay between pleasure and desire, decisive affective experiences that drive human behaviour. Thus, the tension-filled dance of these experiences with the Symbolic and the Imaginary, often in pursuit of the elusive Real, elucidates the ethical quandaries inherent in the most basic formulation of the human pursuit of pleasure and desire. The question for the reader then becomes more interesting still: How does the intersection of cultural norms (Symbolic) and individual fantasies (Imaginary) with desire (Real) raise important ethical considerations?
While psychoanalytic rationalist theories like these might offer profound insights into non-conscious processes, they do not stand unchallenged, even within psychoanalysis. Critics occasionally assail them on grounds of style over substance or plain obscurantism. Moreover, feminist scholars argue that both classical and contemporary psychoanalysis's phallocentric theories perpetuate gender imbalances in ethical considerations.[7] Post-colonial critics add another layer of complexity, interrogating the Eurocentric biases inherent to psychoanalysis's ethical constructs.[8] These critiques challenge us to contemplate how power dynamics and cultural contexts influence the brackets of our moral comprehension of what is deemed 'ethical' or 'unethical' for psychoanalytic practice. Through these criticisms and others, an invitation extends for a more comprehensive engagement with diverse perspectives, which enriches the discourse on psychoanalytic ethics and underscores the necessity of an interdisciplinary dialogue to navigate the complex terrain of psychoanalytic ethics in contemporary relational discourses.
Rationalist Versus Relational Models of Ethics
Lacan's ethics, often misunderstood as endorsing self-enclosure, demand nuanced interpretation. Consider a clinician who initially views Lacanian ethics as a license for hedonistic behaviour. Upon deeper study, they realise that ethics actually call for a nuanced understanding of desire and law.Drawing from Kant, Lacan posits that ethics stem from one's relationship with desire, not external law.[9] A clinician, influenced by Kantian ethics, might initially focus on duty and law. Lacan's perspective would shift this focus towards understanding the client's own desires. This Lacanian ethic intersects intriguingly with ethical intuitionism (see page 2) and ‘postmodern’ appetites. Both ‘ethical intuitionist’ and ‘postmodernist’ thought certainly resist reductive naturalistic explanations of ethical concepts, though they diverge in their epistemological foundations. Imagine a roundtable discussion where scholars of ethical intuitionism, postmodernism, and Lacanian thought debate the foundations of ethics. The overlaps and divergences would be illuminating. Where Moore used a form of intuition, Lacan draws on psychoanalytic techniques to uncover the unconscious structures guiding ethical preferences. However, one may clearly point out that such a radical subjective orientation towards desire may yield ethical complications, such as absolute relativist positions incoherently justifying harmful behaviours under the guise of private 'authenticity.'
Additionally, feminist critiques have questioned the gendered assumptions inherent in Lacanian ethics, arguing that these narratives perpetuate patriarchal symptomatising norms. From a clinical standpoint, the Lacanian ethic often unfolds in the interpretive act of formulation for the clinician. This raises ethical questions about the limits and responsibilities of the clinician's interventions. Does the clinician's interpretation impose an ethical framework, or does it invite the client to confront their own ethical dilemmas more authentically? What checks and balances can ensure that the clinician's facilitation is ethically sound? This complex matrix of theoretical debates and practical implications urges clinicians to critically examine the rationalist ethical stance. Though Lacan supplies a rich scaffold for ethical inquiry, his rationalist framework ought perhaps to be adapted somewhat—that is, manicured, adapted or critiqued for its apparent disinterest in consolation or lovingkindness—to meet the ethical intricacies of psychoanalytic practice today.[10]
However, let us guard against throwing the baby out with the bathwater, as Lacan's contributions to psychoanalytic ethics are as complex as they are provocative.[11] His reconfiguration of 'authenticity' as a duality composed of 'pleasure' and 'misery' strongly challenges normative ethical frameworks that equate 'the Good' directly with 'happiness' (thus, a naturalistic fallacy) and thereof correspondence with human flourishing. Lacan's ethics focus on confronting the Real, not adhering to Western cultural norms (see page 3). In a therapy session, a clinician guided by Lacanian ethics would encourage a client to face uncomfortable truths (the Real) rather than conform to societal expectations. Lacan's ethics concern the symbolic impasse when confronted with the Real and, as such, revolves around the idea that the Real is outside of language and cannot be symbolised.[12] The symbolic impasse arises due to the inherent limitations of language and symbolisation in capturing the essence of the Real. Lacan posits that individuals often create fantasies to shield themselves—using compromise formations—from the anxiety that the Real generates, which, in large part, performs entirely consistently with mainstream psychoanalytic thought. The ethical task is to traverse these fantasies, confront the symbolic impasse, and engage with the Real, says Lacan, acknowledging its unknowable nature while navigating the limitations of the symbolic order. This ethical engagement challenges individuals to confront the inherent lack and desire within human experience, fostering a nuanced understanding of the complexities of the human psyche.
Let us retrace our steps carefully here. Lacan provocatively resituated notions of happiness and authenticity in psychoanalytic ethics. However, his radical perspectives also diverged from established ethical guidelines. Turning to critical perspectives, some argue that psychoanalytic practices require tailored ethical frameworks given their respective relational complexities but fail to mention Lacan’s articulation of Eastern ethical sensibilities.[13] For instance, one finds that the Westernised psychological ethical frameworks rightly emphasise client autonomy, welfare, and limits of confidentiality but cannot accommodate the Eastern philosophical sensibility Lacan says Freud brought to Western ethical attention. This divergence raises questions about the applicability and sufficiency of many existing Westernised ethical codes in catching the idiosyncrasies foreshadowed by rationalist orientations of psychoanalysis.
In this regard, Drozek and Lacan offer distinct yet intersecting perspectives on psychoanalysis and ethics—though Drozek believes his perspective unites psychoanalytic clinicians. Drozek emphasises a dialectical approach where consciousness and unconsciousness interact with the external and internal worlds, promoting a relational theory based on the clinician’s subjectivity. Conversely, Lacan proposes the idea of a symbolic impasse when confronted with the Real. The Real presents a deadlock outside of language and symbolisation as the symbolic order cannot fully capture it. For Drozek, the clinician plays a crucial role in navigating the dialectics between consciousness and unconsciousness, aiming for therapeutic change through the work of Love. Lacan's framework implies that the clinician's role is to help individuals navigate the symbolic impasse, assisting them in confronting the unsymbolisable Real without succumbing to psychosis or other forms of pathological responses. Drozek aims at a therapeutic change through a dialectic process, where both conscious and unconscious processes are navigated and explored without reducing or deconstructing one to the other. Lacan's objective is to help individuals traverse the fantasies that shield them from the existential threat perceived by the apprehension of the Real, confront the symbolic's limitations, and ethically engage with the Real even though it remains ultimately unknowable. Drozek's methodology reads as relational and dialectical, rooted in the clinician's subjectivity and appreciation of the complex interplay between consciousness and unconsciousness. Lacan's method is structured around rationalist linguistic and symbolic analysis, exploring the gaps, inconsistencies, and impasses within the symbolic order as a means to approach or negotiate with an ineffable Real. Drozek and Lacan acknowledge the complex interplay between the conscious and unconscious domains, although they approach and interpret this cooperation differently. Both perspectives underline the importance of an ethical engagement in psychoanalytic practice, recognising the profound complexity of human psychic experience. Thus, while Drozek's view is rooted in a dialectical and relational approach, Lacan's existential rationalism hinges on linguistic and symbolic analysis, each offering a unique lens through which to engage with the domains of consciousness, unconsciousness, and the ethical dimensions of Love in practice—the former foregrounds the work of Love, the latter existential actualities.
Debates and Critiques in Psychoanalytic Ethics
In the spirited debate over psychoanalytic ethics thus far, several arguments and rebuttals have been posed. One comes from the feminist psychoanalytic community, which contends that traditional psychoanalytic ethics are suffused with heteronormative, patriarchal, and symptomising norms. This critique posits that a phallocentric ethos inadvertently perpetuates gender biases. In rebuttal, psychoanalysis inherently encourages nuanced feminist critiques. A feminist psychoanalyst might argue that the field's focus on the individual psyche provides room for dismantling patriarchal norms, countering the critique that psychoanalysis perpetuates gender biases. This flexibility in the psychoanalytic ethos can serve as a vehicle for progressive change, including dismantling exclusive binary normatives.
Another significant critique comes from empirical psychologists who question the scientific validity of psychoanalytic practices. They argue that without empirical verification, ethical guidelines become arbitrary. In response, one might invoke ethical intuitionism (see page 2) to contend that ethical truth may not always be reducible to empirical facts or naturalistic explanations. In this light, psychoanalytic ethics could be seen as part of a broader ethical discourse that transcends scientific empiricism, necessitating novel ethical intuitions or new foundations.
Consequentialists claim that psychoanalytic ethics neglect the outcomes of therapeutic interventions. Consider a clinician who focuses solely on the process of therapy without considering its long-term impact on the client's life, thereby neglecting consequentialist ethical considerations. This perspective calls for outcome-based ethical guidelines. In response to the consequentialist critique, a psychoanalytic institution might develop guidelines that require clinicians to consider the long-term effects of their interventions. Yet, here, one may counter that psychoanalysis offers a more complex, relationally dynamic framework that resists reductive outcome metrics, say, the quality of trust and rapport in the working alliance. One could argue that this complexity is essential for maintaining the nuanced ethics required in psychoanalytic practice.
Positioning Love or Eros at the pinnacle of psychoanalytic ethics while avoiding the naturalistic fallacy poses a compelling challenge. Moore's naturalistic fallacy suggests that natural tendencies or biological benefits do not automatically equate to ethical 'Goodness.' Elevating Love to an ethical pinnacle involves a nuanced balancing act. While Love can serve as a moral guide, it is crucial to avoid simplifying it into a 'natural good,' thereby committing the naturalistic fallacy. Love or Eros, though intrinsically tied to pleasure, relationships, and well-being, is also much more than a sum of these naturalistic attributes. First, let us consider the role of Eros in the psychoanalytic framework. Freud originally framed Eros as a life instinct, contrasting it with the death instinct. Love, in its broadest sense, was tied to both self-preservation and species-preservation. The ethical aspect of Eros extends beyond instinctual traits, manifesting in transference dynamics, empathy, and clinician-client obligations. In a therapeutic setting, Love is not just about care and compassion; it also involves navigating the complexities of transference, countertransference, and even ethical dilemmas like dual relationships. One way to elevate Love or Eros ethically is by emphasising its transformative potential in psychoanalytic practice. Here, Love is not merely a naturalistic concept but a relational one involving ethical obligations like responsibility, care, and the acknowledgement of the other's subjectivity. In this regard, Eros transcends its biological or instinctual framework and becomes a facilitator of ethical encounters and relational dynamics that activate genuine transformation and self-actualisation. Another approach might involve an integration of the concept of 'agape,' an unconditional, selfless form of Love, into psychoanalytic discourse. By doing so, Love transcends its often object- or goal-oriented nature and becomes an ethical stance, a mode of relationality that inherently respects the autonomy and worth of the other. One must also consider the unconscious dimensions of Love and its ethical implications. Love is never just a conscious, rational decision but involves unconscious factors, fantasies, and transferences that both clinician and client need to navigate carefully. The ethically responsible management of these unconscious dimensions could be viewed as a further elevation of Love to a pinnacle of psychoanalytic ethics. Thus, to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, any ethical conceptualisation of Love or Eros in psychoanalysis should be multi-dimensional, incorporating not just its instinctual aspects but also its relational, transformational, and unconscious sides. By anchoring it in a complex matrix of relational responsibilities and transformative possibilities, Love or Eros could indeed occupy a pivotal role in psychoanalytic ethics without succumbing to reductive naturalism.
While the preceding argument foregrounds the necessity of developing relational ethical frameworks—tailored to the intricacies of psychoanalytic theory and practice—some scholars contend that existing ethical systems are sufficient in this domain (see below). A primary counterargument stems from classical psychoanalytic perspectives, which hold that psychoanalysis encompasses a complete ethical system. This viewpoint conceptualises the psychoanalytic endeavour—which has as its central aim explaining a dialectic between consciousness and unconscious processes through the work of Love in order to expand self-awareness and emotional development—as intrinsically ethical. As Charles Hanly (2012) asserts, ‘Freud was quite explicit in affirming that psychoanalysis represents an ethical project and achievement.’[14] From this stance, the practice of psychoanalysis equates with living an ethical life, superseding the need for external philosophical ethics. Illuminating the client’s unconscious through methods like free association and dream analysis is an inherently ethical process that promotes self-knowledge if not self-actualisation. According to followers of this perspective, the implicit ethics embedded in the therapeutic goals and methods of psychoanalysis are comprehensive and sufficient. For instance, Owen Renik (1995) argues that ‘psychoanalysis contains its own ethics, which are not necessarily identical to those of other disciplines or of society at large’ oriented around the clinician’s duty to understand the client’s conflicts and make interpretations to facilitate change.[15] The analytical relationship itself, when properly conducted, encapsulates ethical treatment. Since psychoanalysis presumes to enhance psychological functioning and autonomy by nature, it is viewed as aligning with humanistic ethical values, obviating further moral codes.
However, critics counter that psychoanalysis cannot constitute a complete ethical system, given its lack of allegiance to any single philosophical tradition. While revealing the unconscious may resonate with some ethical intuitions, this act alone does not amount to systematic ethics in the robust sense.[16] The argument goes that psychoanalysis notably lacks explicit principles equivalent to medical or bioethics’ focused goals of promoting client welfare, autonomy, and justice. Hence, psychoanalysis cannot provide decisive guidance when ethical dilemmas arise involving conflicts between prudential, deontological, and care-based obligations. Diffuse ethical orientations, continuing the same argument, necessitates supplementation from adjacent frameworks. For instance, consider the case of Bob, who expresses a wish to terminate therapy against the clinician's clinical judgment abruptly. Bob believes he has achieved sufficient personal growth, but the clinician sees underlying issues unresolved. This creates an ethical tension between respecting Bob’s autonomy and a duty of care to promote his welfare. Drozek might presumably approach this case by focusing on the dialectical interplay between Bob’s conscious expression to terminate therapy and unconscious factors that may be motivating this decision against the clinician's clinical judgment. Drozek might also examine whether and the extent to which anxieties, defences, or transference dynamics could influence Bob’s stated preference. The termination could represent resistance or avoidance of probing deeper insights. In contrast, normative medical ethics would view respecting the client's autonomy and right to discontinue treatment as ethically primary. However, clinicians like Drozek might argue that the unconscious dimension complicates notions of autonomy in psychoanalysis. Bob may not act from a fully integrated conscious/unconscious place in this choice. This case example reveals core tensions in psychoanalytic ethics that the paper has been exploring. The case example illustrates the insufficiency of mainstream biomedical principles like autonomy when applied to complex clinical situations full of ambiguity and unconscious elements. Drozek offers a more subtle meta-ethical approach tailored to psychoanalysis's dynamics, factoring both conscious and unconscious processes to assess Bob’s or any other client’s readiness to end. And yet, tensions remain regarding when formulation ought to lead versus follow the client. The case example underscores the challenges and opportunities in balancing humanistic goals and client interests ethically.
A second significant counterargument contends that current medical and professional ethics standards insufficiently cover any moral questions unique to psychoanalysis. These encompass core biomedical ethics values like respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice (collectively termed principlism). Formulations like ‘principlism’ or the ‘Hippocratic Oath’ are thought to translate slowly to psychoanalytic settings, ensuring cogent ethical practice. Proponents of this position grant that psychoanalysis involves distinctive relational dynamics but maintain that existing principles can flexibly address novel issues like transference and countertransference. For example, Estelle Shane (2008) argues that the complex concept of ‘autonomy’ can deepen through psychoanalysis to mean fostering a client’s ‘authentic’ wishes rather than merely a nondirective choice.[17] In a therapeutic setting, a clinician might initially focus on giving the client choices (non-directive), but upon deeper reflection, they invite clients to understand and foster their authentic wishes (directive). For Shane, prevailing medical codes thus remain relevant with thoughtful translation. From this standpoint, established guidelines sufficiently cover psychoanalysis if understood contextually. However, critics like Donna Orange (2012) contend that mainstream bioethics frequently proves inadequate or devolves into incoherence when handling the subtleties or interpersonal nuances pervasive in psychoanalysis. Imagine a clinician who strictly adheres to mainstream bioethical guidelines but struggles to navigate the complexities of transference and countertransference. Orange argues that principles like autonomy or nonmaleficence falter when applied to complex analytic situations involving discretion, ambiguity, and unconscious factors. For instance, client autonomy becomes problematic if their desired course of action seems to stem from neurotic anxiety as opposed to authentic growth. However, the clinician overriding the client's wishes also breaches respect for self-determination. Orange concludes that attempts to extend existing ethics to psychoanalysis fail, revealing the need to develop moral frameworks tailored to its distinctive dynamics.[18]
A third counterargument posits Love or Eros as a universal ethical source, transcending specific cultures and codes. Psychoanalysts frequently cite Love as foundational to human ethics and development. From this perspective, the therapeutic relationship itself stands for a form of ethical Love in action (the work of Love). As Jessica Benjamin (1988) proposes, ‘The clinician’s Love, his Eros, is made manifest in his desire to know the client; the client’s health depends on being able to find or accept that Love.’[19] The clinician's loving engagement models an ethical ideal that naturally promotes healing. Viewing Love as central to psychoanalytic ethics may bypass or coexist with other ethical frameworks. Michael Guy Thompson (2015) exemplifies this view: 'Insofar as Love is considered universally ethical, its presence in an analysis is an ethical presence regardless of theoretical background or clinical context.’[20] The idea of universally beneficent analytic Love seems to transcend sectarian debates. Consider an eclectic clinician who integrates various theoretical frameworks, from Freudian to Jungian to Attachment-based. Thompson's argument suggests that the ethical value of Love would remain constant, serving as a moral compass across different psychoanalytic approaches. Critics note that psychoanalysis presents a more nuanced view of Love than this ethic assumes. While care aspects are ethically important, psychoanalysis also acknowledges Love's complexities. As Stephen Mitchell (1993) observes, ‘From a psychoanalytic perspective, the personal passions that we call Love are as likely to be impediments to ethical behaviour as sources of it.’[21] Hence, the presence of Love or the work of Love cannot inherently guarantee ethical relations in the consulting room or society. Thus, complexities surrounding the presence of Love demand subtle ethical discernment beyond treating Love as self-evidently ethical as such.
Some scholars mount forceful rebuttals disputing the need for distinct ethical frameworks tailored for psychoanalysis. These proponents of psychoanalysis contend that its inherent methods form a complete ethical system. Advocates of established medical ethics argue that such principles successfully translate given thoughtful application. Defenders of Love as the core ethical nucleus view it as universally beneficent. However, as this section may helpfully elucidate, these counterclaims are disputable given psychoanalysis’s diffuse ethical orientations, the oversimplifications of applied medical ethics, and the ambiguity of Love’s ethical import. Counterclaims like these run the risk of evading the myriad complexities of moral experience unique to psychoanalytic theory and practice. Thus, while counterviews deserve close consideration or conceptual analysis, they do not seem to negate the merits of developing subtle psychoanalytic metaethics beyond prevailing alternatives. The search for ethical foundations and guidance attuned to psychoanalysis’s relational granularities stays vital and open to discovery.
Envisioning the Future of Psychoanalytic Ethics
Psychoanalytic ethics require more than superficial reflection; they demand sustained, pioneering inquiry. Imagine a research institute dedicated solely to exploring the ethical dimensions of psychoanalysis, going beyond mere academic discussions to practical applications. Here, 'ethics' extends beyond moral rules, drawing from ethical intuitionism (see page 2). Consider a clinician who moves beyond a rule-based approach to ethics, incorporating intuitive moral reasoning inspired by ethical intuitionism. Developing nuanced ethics remains crucial, focusing on crucial concepts like Love, transference, countertransference, and the dialectic of consciousness and unconsciousness. A training program for clinicians may include modules that delve into these seminal metaethical concepts, equipping clinicians with tools to navigate metaethical complexities. The autonomy of the therapeutic space is no sanctuary for ethical neutrality; it is instead a crucible for moral dilemmas borne from the mutual influence between clinician and client. Clinicians ought to therefore cultivate a heightened self-reflexivity, acknowledging the sociocultural imprint that subtly shapes their interpretative authority. Feminist, post-colonial, and critical theories supply essential scaffolds for this self-examination or reflexivity. However, let us not yield to formulaic ethical prescriptions that stifle the artfulness inherent in psychoanalytic practice. In a counter-intuitive sense, ethical precision may necessitate what Wilfred Bion borrowed from Keats—the cultivation of 'negative capability,' or the aptitude to dwell in uncertainty, eschewing premature judgments. This marks a novel frontier for psychoanalytic ethics: a liminal space where rationalist rigidity succumbs to emotionally safe uncertainty.
Moreover, a pointed rethinking may be necessary in handling conflicts between a clinician's clinical perception and a client's articulated desires. An ethical litmus test for potential paternalism ought to be devised—meticulous but not prohibitive, balancing private authenticity against public or collective safety. Last, as we expand our gaze to a more interconnected or artificially augmented world, our ethical frame must likewise expand, seeking wisdom in non-Westernised philosophies to challenge parochial dualistic conceptions of self and other relations. Widening the brackets of our awareness is more than mere intellectual courtesy; it is more a prerequisite for an ethics that resonates globally. The task before us with a professional interest in psychoanalytic practice is not mere refinement but an ethical metamorphosis. Through meticulous scholarship and thoughtful practice, psychoanalytic ethics has the potential to refine its foundations and revolutionise its applicability. As we navigate these complexities, let us boldly envisage an ethics deeply integral to the psychoanalytic vocation—Love and the work of Love—as a robust, multifaceted metaethical imperative capable of intuiting the unique tensions betwixt and between consciousness and unconsciousness, clinician and client.
Endnotes
[1] In this respect I wish sincere thanks to Robert Drozek for his excellent work. Please see Drozek, R. P. (2019). Psychoanalysis as an ethical process. London and New York: Routledge. Also see Ogden, T. H. (1992). The dialectically constituted/decentred subject of psychoanalysis. I. The Freudian subject. The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 73(3), 517–526.
[2] Moore, G.E. (1903/1993). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.
[3] Benjamin, J. (1988). The bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, feminism, and the problem of domination. Pantheon Books
[4] Drozek, R. P. (2019). Psychoanalysis as an ethical process. Routledge, p.251-252.
[5] Roustang, F. (1986). How to make a paranoid laugh: Or, what is psychoanalysis? (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). University of Pennsylvania Press. (Original work published 1980). p. 15. Here, François Roustang follows Jacques Lacan’s mention of him (Ecrits) when calling upon Emile Meyerson’s (La déduction relativiste (1925). Paris: Payot) definition of and for the real, which, ironically, appears as near impossible to locate physically as makes no difference.
[6] Žižek, S. (1989). The sublime object of ideology. Verso. p. 164
[7] Please see Kristeva, J. (1984). Revolution in poetic language. (M. Waller, Trans.) Columbia University Press. Also see Irigaray, L. (2002). To Speak is Never Neutral (G. Schwab, Trans.). Routledge.
[8] Said, E. W. (2003). Freud and the non-European. Verso.
[9] Please see Lacan, J. (2006). Écrits. (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1966).
[10] I owe the manicuring analogy entirely to Adam Phillips. Please see Phillips, A. (2002). The manicuring of Jacques Lacan. In A. Phillips, Promises, promises: Essays on literature and psychoanalysis (pp. 107-112). Faber & Faber.
[11] Lacan, J. (1992). The ethics of psychoanalysis 1959-1960: The seminar of Jacques Lacan (J.-A. Miller, Ed.; D. Porter, Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1986)
[12] An ethical concept founded and more readily accepted, and with more devotees, in Eastern traditions, than those found in Western traditions.
[13] Please see Harvey, P (2000). An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
[14] Hanly, C. (2012). Psychoanalysis and ethics. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 93(6), 1385-1401. p. 1385
[15] Renik, O. (1995). The perils of neutrality. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 64(3), 494-5171. p. 495
[16] Lear, J. (2003). Therapeutic Action: An Earnest Plea for Irony. New York: Other Press. p. 13
[17] Shane, E. (2008). Developmental systems self psychology. International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psychology, 3(1), 1-20. p. 2
[18] Orange, D. M. (2012). What kind of ethics? Loewald on responsibility and atonement. International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psychology, 7(4), 397-413. P. 398
[19] Benjamin, J. (1988). The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination. New York: Pantheon Books. p. 22
[20] Thompson, M. G. (2015). Love and the ethical dimension of psychoanalysis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 63(6), 1089-1112. p. 1090
[21] Mitchell, S. A. (1993). Hope and Dread in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. p. 5
